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Abstract—In this paper we present a new proof technique for
semi-quantum key distribution protocols which makes use of a
quantum entropic uncertainty relation to bound an adversary’s
information. Our new technique provides a more optimistic key-
rate bound than previous work relying only on noise statistics
(as opposed to using additional mismatched measurements which
increase the noise tolerance of this protocol, but at the cost of
requiring four times the amount of measurement data). Our
new technique may hold application in the proof of security of
other semi-quantum protocols or protocols relying on two-way
quantum communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols allow for the
establishment of a secret key between two parties Alice (A)
and Bob (B) which is secure even against an all-powerful
adversary Eve (E) - that is, an adversary bounded only by the
laws of physics and not by any computational assumptions as
is required when using classical communication only. Numer-
ous QKD protocols have been proposed, many with rigorous
proofs of unconditional security. The reader is referred to [1]
for a general survey.
However, these QKD protocols, and their security analysis,
require both A and B to be “quantum capable.” Namely,
both A and B must be equipped with devices capable of
manipulating quantum resources in certain, arbitrary, ways
(e.g., preparing and measuring qubits in certain bases). In
2007, Boyer et al., in [2] introduced the semi-quantum model
of cryptography whereby only A was required to be quantum
while B was allowed to be very limited and “classical” in
his capabilities. These semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD)
protocols are interesting to study theoretically as they attempt
to answer the question “ how quantum does a protocol need to
be to gain an advantage over its classical counterpart?” There
are also potential practical benefits to studying these protocols:
for example, B’s device could be cheaper to manufacture;
alternatively, one can consider designing a QKD infrastructure
more robust to technical failure - indeed, if a device ever
breaks down, one may switch to a “semi-quantum” mode and
continue secure operations until the device is fully repaired.
SQKD protocols, however, require a two-way quantum
communication channel (one which allows A to send qubits
to B who then sends qubits back to A) greatly increasing the
complexity of their security analysis. Though several SQKD
protocols have been proposed (see [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12] for a few), until 2015, most were
proven only to be robust - a notion introduced in [2] which
says any attack which causes E to gain non-zero information
on the key must induce a disturbance which can be detected
with non-zero probability. Some authors considered security
against individual attacks [13] (attacks whereby E is forced
to measure her quantum ancilla before the protocol concludes).
It wasn’t until 2015, that rigorous proofs of security became
available in [14], [15], [16].
In a recent work [17], we showed that the original SQKD
protocol of Boyer et al., has a noise tolerance of 11% - exactly
the same as the fully-quantum BB84 protocol. Our result in
[17], however, required the use of numerous measurements,
including mismatched measurements [18], [19]. Ultimately, to
compute the key-rate of the Boyer et al., protocol, using our
technique in that paper, one must look at over 12 different
measurement statistics and then evaluate a series of lengthy
equations. (Indeed, our key-rate equation for the SQKD pro-
tocol spanned numerous pages!)
In this work, we revisit this semi-quantum protocol and
derive a simpler, and far more elegant (in the author’s opinion)
proof of security using a quantum uncertainty bound to evalu-
ate the von Neumann entropy of the resulting quantum system.
Our new bound does not use mismatched measurements (only
error rates) and, so, the noise tolerance is not as high as in [17];
however our new result is higher than previous best-known
results for this protocol without mismatched measurements.
Furthermore, the technique we present here may be simpler
to adapt to other SQKD protocols than the technique using
mismatched measurements - especially for higher-dimensional
protocols (such as [20]) where the technique of mismatched
measurements can become intractable.
There are several contributions made in this work, many
of which we expect would hold great application outside
the scope of this paper. First, we show that for any semi-
quantum protocol, it is sufficient to consider a restricted form
of collective attack. Second, we show an entirely new approach
to proving security of semi-quantum protocols; we show how
to convert a particular SQKD protocol into an equivalent
entanglement based version and we derive a new key-rate
bound which does not require the use of numerous mismatched
measurement statistics and which produces a higher noise
tolerance than previous work without these statistics (along
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with a far simpler key-rate expression). Note that, in [21], a
technique of converting certain two-way QKD protocols into
equivalent entanglement based versions was shown; however
their result could only be applied to protocols where B’s
output is independent of his input averaged over all of his
operations - this property is sadly lacking in the semi-quantum
model and so a new method is required which we introduce in
this paper. Third, our proof shows a new and interesting appli-
cation of a quantum uncertainty bound to the semi-quantum
model of cryptography and also an interesting application of a
continuity bound on conditional von Neumann entropy which
may be of great use when proving security of new protocols
in the semi-quantum model (or, more generally, for protocols
relying on a two-way channel which may not hold certain
symmetry properties).
A. Notation
We assume the reader is familiar with basic quantum infor-
mation theory and so here we will only introduce our notation
and a few general concepts; for a general survey see [22]. The
computational Z basis is defined to be {|0〉 , |1〉} while the
Hadamard X basis is {|+〉 , |−〉}, where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉±|1〉).
We denote by H(p1, · · · , pn) to be the Shannon entropy of
p1, · · · , pn. If A and B are random variables, then H(A|B) is
the conditional Shannon entropy of A conditioned on B. By
h(x) we mean the binary entropy function: h(x) = H(x, 1−
x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x). All logarithms in this
paper are base two.
A density operator is a Hermitian positive semi-definite
operator of unit trace. If ρ is a density operator acting on
Hilbert space HA⊗HB , we often write ρAB . In this case, we
write ρB to mean the operator resulting from tracing out A;
i.e., ρB = trAρAB . Similarly when the operator acts on larger
systems. We also will write HAB to denote HA ⊗HB .
Given density operator ρAB we write S(AB)ρ to mean
the von Neumann entropy of ρAB . We write S(A|B)ρ to
mean the conditional von Neumann entropy: S(A|B)ρ =
S(AB)ρ−S(B)ρ. If the context is clear, we will forgo writing
the subscript “ρ.”
Given an operator A, we write ||A|| to mean the trace norm
of A. If A is Hermitian and finite dimensional, then ||A|| =∑
i |λi|, where {λi} are the eigenvalues of A.
If z ∈ Cm×n, then we write z∗ to mean the conjugate
transpose of z. Also, we define D = {z ∈ C | |z| ≤ 1}.
Finally, we write [a,b]AB to mean |a, b〉 〈a, b|AB .
B. (S)QKD Security
A (S)QKD protocol operates in two stages: first a quantum
communication stage whereby users utilize the communication
resources available to them (typically a quantum channel
and an authenticated classical channel) to establish a raw-key
which is a string of 0’s and 1’s which is partially correlated
and partially secret. In general, this yields a classical-classical-
quantum state of the form:
ρABE =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}n
[a,b]AB ⊗ ρ(a,b)E , (1)
where the A and B register represent A and B’s raw-key
respectively, while ρ(a,b)E (which is not necessarily of unit
trace) represents the state of E’s memory in the event A
and B have a raw-key of a and b respectively. Following the
quantum communication stage, a classical stage consisting of
error correction and privacy amplification is run producing a
secret key of size `(n) bits which may then be used for other
cryptographic protocols.
An important question is, given certain observations on E’s
attack (e.g., the error rate), how large is `(n)? For collective
attacks (attacks whereby E performs the same attack operation
each iteration however is free to postpone measurement of her
ancilla until any future time of her choice), Equation 1 takes
on the simpler form:
ρABE =
 ∑
a,b∈{0,1}
[a,b]AB ⊗ ρ(a,b)E
⊗n ,
in which case the Devetak-Winter key-rate expression [23]
may be employed which states:
r := lim
n→∞
`(n)
n
= inf[S(A|E)−H(A|B)], (2)
where the infimum is over all collective attacks which induce
the observed noise statistics. Computing a bound on this
expression is the key critical element of any (S)QKD security
proof [1].
II. THE PROTOCOL
The protocol we consider is the original SQKD protocol
of Boyer et al., introduced in [2], [3]. This protocol, being
a semi-quantum one, assumes that A is fully quantum in
that she can prepare and measure qubits in arbitrary bases;
however B is classical in that he can only directly work with
the computational Z basis. In more detail, a SQKD protocol
utilizes a two-way quantum channel. We call the channel
connecting A to B the forward channel and the channel
connecting B to A the reverse channel. Each iteration of
the quantum communication stage, A will prepare and send a
qubit. B is then restricted to choosing between two operations:
Measure and Resend or to Reflect. If he chooses
Measure and Resend, he will subject the incoming qubit
to a Z basis measurement and prepare a new qubit in the same
state he observed (i.e., if his measurement result is |r〉, for
r ∈ {0, 1}, he will send a qubit |r〉 back to A); if he chooses
Reflect he will completely disconnect from the quantum
channel, allowing the qubit to pass through his lab undisturbed,
and return to A (in essence, if B chooses Reflect, A is
“talking to herself”).
The protocol we consider, and which we denote as ΠSQKD,
operates as follows:
1) A chooses to send a qubit of the form |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, or
|−〉, choosing randomly.
2) B will choose to Measure and Resend or to
Reflect. If he chooses Measure and Resend he
will save his measurement result in a classical register
to serve as his potential raw-key bit for this iteration.
3) A will measure in the same basis she originally used to
send.
4) A will disclose her choice of basis; B will disclose
his choice of operation (Measure and Resend or
Reflect). This is done using an authenticated classical
channel.
5) If A used the Z basis and if B chose to
Measure and Resend, then they will use this itera-
tion to contribute towards their raw-key. A will use her
initial preparation choice as her key bit (equivalently, she
may use her measurement result at the end - our security
analysis will apply to both cases). Other iterations, along
with a suitably sized random subset of these “raw-key”
iterations, may be used to estimate the error rate in the
channel. In particular, A and B may estimate the Z
basis error rate in the forward, reverse, and joint channel.
They may also observe the X basis error rate in the joint
channel (but not the forward or reverse separately since
B is unable to prepare or measure in the X basis).
It is not difficult to see that the protocol is correct. We
analyze its security by determining a new lower-bound on
the Devetak-Winter key-rate expression (Equation 2) for this
protocol.
III. SECURITY PROOF
We prove security against collective attacks in this paper -
we will comment on general attacks later. Collective attacks
are those where E applies the same attack operation each
iteration of the protocol, but is free to postpone measurement
of her ancilla until any future time of her choice. In the semi-
quantum model, where an attacker has two opportunities to
attack a qubit each iteration, a collective attack is a pair of
unitary operators (UF , UR), each acting on the Hilbert space
HT⊗HE (hereHT is the two-dimensional space modeling the
qubit “transit” space while HE is E’s quantum ancilla). The
operator UF is applied in the Forward channel (as a qubit
travels from A to B) while UR is applied in the Reverse
channel (when the qubit returns from B to A).
Our proof of security follows three steps. First, we will
prove that for any semi-quantum protocol, it is sufficient
to consider a particular “restricted” collective attack which
is easier to analyze mathematically, but does not cause E
to lose attack power. Second, using this result, we show
how to convert the protocol of interest into a mathematically
equivalent entanglement based version . Third, we use a quan-
tum uncertainty bound and a continuity bound on conditional
entropy to analyze the entanglement based version - security
of the SQKD protocol will then follow. See Figure 1.
A. Restricted Attacks
In [5], we showed that for any single-state SQKD protocol
(i.e., those where A is restricted to sending a single, publicly
known, qubit state each iteration, typically |+〉 [4]), to prove
security against collective attacks it is sufficient to consider
Fig. 1. Our security proof in pictures (note: QM = “Quantum Memory”).
(1) is an arbitrary collective attack against the actual SQKD protocol (with
classical Bob) that we wish to analyze. We show that for every such attack,
there is an equivalent restricted attack (2). Next, we show that, mathematically,
analyzing (2) is the same as analyzing a different protocol where a quantum
Bob prepares pairs of qubits (and his qubit source is partially influenced
by Eve, represented here as a shaded region in B’s lab) and sends them to
Alice; namely, for every restricted attack against the SQKD protocol, there is
an equivalent attack against our new protocol where first Eve “rewinds” the
channel state with operator Rw (simulating the system had A sent a qubit first
instead of B), and then attacks one of the qubits. Of course analyzing (4),
where Eve is not restricted to performing this “rewind” attack, only gives her
more power. Thus security in (4) ⇒ (3) ⇒ (2) ⇒ (1), our original goal.
security against a “restricted” attack whereby Eve, in the
forward channel, need only bias Bob’s measurement result; in
the reverse channel, she applies an arbitrary unitary operator.
That is, it is not required that she perform an arbitrary unitary
operator in the forward channel, entangling the qubit with her
private quantum memory. Such attacks are easier to analyze -
and have been used in [15], [16] to show security of several
different single-state protocols - however, as shown in [5], the
result is only correct for single state protocols. The original
SQKD protocol of Boyer et al., which we are considering in
this work (i.e., ΠSQKD), is a multi-state protocol, one where
A prepares different states each iteration, choosing randomly
each time. However, it remained an open question as to
whether or not some other form of restricted attack might be
constructed for multi-state protocols. We answer this question
in the affirmative.
Definition III.1. Let B = {|v0〉 , |v1〉} be an orthonormal
basis. A multi-state restricted collective attack with respect to
B is a tuple (q0, q1, η0, η1, U), where q0, q1 ∈ [0, 1]; η0, η1 ∈ D
subject to the restriction that q0η1
√
1− q21 + q1η∗0
√
1− q20 =
0; and U is a unitary operator acting on HT ⊗HE . The attack
consists of the following actions:
1) When E first captures the qubit from A in the forward
channel, she applies the operator F , acting on HT ⊗HE
which acts as follows:
F |v0〉 = q0 |0, 0〉TE +
√
1− q20 |1, e〉TE (3)
F |v1〉 =
√
1− q21 |0, f〉TE + q1 |1, 0〉TE ,
where:
|e〉 = η0 |0〉E +
√
1− |η0|2 |1〉E (4)
|f〉 = η1 |0〉E +
√
1− |η1|2 |1〉E . (5)
Note that it is not difficult to see, considering the
restrictions on the values η0, η1, q0, and q1, that F is
an isometry and may therefore be easily extended to a
unitary operator; thus this is an operation E can perform
within the laws of quantum physics.
2) When the qubit returns from B (on its way back to A
in the reverse channel), E captures it again, and applies
the unitary operator U .
When the context is clear, we will simply call the above
attack a restricted attack as opposed to its longer title. The
following theorem proves that it is sufficient to consider these
restricted attacks when proving security of any semi-quantum
protocol against arbitrary collective attacks.
Theorem 1. Let B = {|v0〉 , |v1〉} be an arbitrary orthonormal
basis. For every collective attack C = (UF , UR), there exists
a restricted attack R = (q0, q1, η0, η1, U) such that, for any
SQKD protocol with quantum A and classical B, the following
are true:
1) A and B cannot distinguish between attack C and R.
2) E’s final quantum system is the same regardless of
whether she used C or R.
3) The key-rate is equal under both attacks.
Proof. Let B be given and fix a collective attack C =
(UF , UR), where UF is a unitary operator applied in the
forward channel while UR is a unitary operator applied in
the reverse. We will construct a restricted attack R satisfying
the required conditions. Without loss of generality, we may
assume E’s system is cleared to some “zero” state |χ〉E at the
start of the attack. In this case, we may write UF ’s action on
basis states as follows:
UF |v0, χ〉 = α |0, e0〉TE +
√
1− α2 |1, e1〉TE
UF |v1, χ〉 =
√
1− β2 |0, e2〉TE + β |1, e3〉TE
where α, β ∈ [0, 1] (any phase may be absorbed into the
vectors |ei〉) and the |ei〉 are arbitrary normalized (though not
necessarily orthogonal) states in HE . Let q0 = α and q1 = β
for our restricted attack.
Unitarity of UF imposes the following condition:
α
√
1− β2 〈e0|e2〉+ β
√
1− α2 〈e1|e3〉 = 0.
Let η0 = 〈e3|e1〉 and η1 = 〈e0|e2〉 for our restricted attack
R (this clearly satisfies the required restrictions on qi and
ηi). Now, first consider the case that |ηi| < 1 (the case when
|ηi| = 1 for one or both i will be considered afterwards). Let
V be the operator acting on states in HT ⊗HE as follows:
V |0, 0〉TE = |0, e0〉 V |1, 0〉TE = |1, e3〉
V |0, 1〉TE = |0, g0〉 V |1, 1〉TE = |1, g1〉
where:
|g0〉 = |e2〉 − η1 |e0〉√
1− |η1|2
, |g1〉 = |e1〉 − η0 |e3〉√
1− |η0|2
.
We claim that V is an isometry. First, it is clear that each |gi〉
is normalized. Indeed:
〈g0|g0〉 = 1 + |η1|
2 − 2Re(η1 〈e2|e0〉)
1− |η1|2
=
1 + |η1|2 − 2Re|η1|2
1− |η1|2 = 1,
where, above, we used the fact that η1 = 〈e0|e2〉. A similar
computation yields 〈g1|g1〉 = 1. What remains to be shown is
that 〈e0|g0〉 = 〈e3|g1〉 = 0. But this is clear:
〈e0|g0〉 = 〈e0|e2〉 − η1√
1− |η0|2
=
η1 − η1√
1− |η0|2
= 0,
and similarly for 〈e3|g1〉. We conclude, therefore, that V is
an isometry which may be extended to a unitary operator
(its action on states not shown above is irrelevant). In the
following, we will assume V is simply unitary.
To simplify notation in the remainder of this proof, let Ni =√
1− |ηi|2. By linearity of V , it follows that:
V |1, e〉TE = V (η0 |1, 0〉+N0 |1, 1〉)
= η0 |1, e3〉+N0 |1〉 ⊗
( |e1〉 − η0 |e3〉
N0
)
= |1, e1〉 ,
and similarly, V |0, f〉 = |0, e2〉 (where |e〉 and |f〉 are the
states resulting from the action of the restricted attack operator
F defined in Equations 4 and 5).
Let U = URV . We claim that R = (q0, q1, η0, η1, U), as
constructed above, is the desired restricted attack. (Note, we
are still assuming for the time being, that |ηi| < 1.)
We first consider the case where A’s sent state is pure; for
mixed states the result will follow immediately due to linearity
of the operations. On any particular iteration of the protocol,
let |a〉 = x |v0〉+ y |v1〉 be the state prepared and sent by A.
These x and y are potentially known only to A (i.e., A may
choose, each iteration, to send a randomly prepared state in
which case the x and y are chosen randomly). Let |ψR〉 be
the state of the qubit as it arrives to B if E uses the restricted
attack as constructed above. Let |ψC〉 be the state if E uses
the collective attack C = (UF , UR). These are both easily
computed:
|ψR〉 = F |a〉 = |0〉 ⊗
(
xq0 |0〉E + y
√
1− q21 |f〉E
)
(6)
+ |1〉 ⊗
(
x
√
1− q20 |e〉E + yq1 |0〉E
)
.
|ψC〉 = UF |a, χ〉 = |0〉 ⊗
(
xα |e0〉+ y
√
1− β2 |e2〉
)
(7)
+ |1〉 ⊗
(
x
√
1− α2 |e1〉+ yβ |e3〉
)
.
At this point, B will either Measure and Resend
(saving his measurement result in a private register) or
Reflect. We first consider the case where he chooses
Measure and Resend. Let ρR be the result of this opera-
tion in the restricted attack case and ρC the result in the general
collective attack case. These density operators are found to be:
ρR = [0,0]BT ⊗ P
(
xq0 |0〉E + y
√
1− q21 |f〉E
)
+ [1,1]BT ⊗ P
(
x
√
1− q20 |e〉E + yq1 |0〉E
)
ρC = [0,0]BT ⊗ P
(
xα |e0〉+ y
√
1− β2 |e2〉
)
+ [1,1]BT ⊗ P
(
x
√
1− α2 |e1〉+ yβ |e3〉
)
,
where P (z) = zz∗. At this point, if E is using the restricted
attack, she will now apply the operator U = URV . However,
V ’s action of ρR evolves the state to:
V ρRV ∗ = [0,0]BT ⊗ P
(
xα |e0〉+ y
√
1− β2 |e2〉
)
+ [1,1]BT ⊗ P
(
x
√
1− α2 |e1〉+ yβ |e3〉
)
= ρC .
Thus, it is clear that UρRU∗ = URρCU∗R and so the resulting
quantum state is identical regardless of whether E used the
restricted attack R or the collective attack C (A, B, and E’s
systems are identical regardless).
We now consider the case when B reflects. Let σR be the
state of the system when the qubit leaves B’s lab and E used
the restricted attack; let σC be the state of the system if E
uses the collective attack. That is: σR = |ψR〉 〈ψR| and σC =
|ψC〉 〈ψC |, where |ψR〉 and |ψC〉 are defined in Equations 6
and 7. It is trivial to show that V σRV ∗ = σC and so the result
holds in the case B reflects.
In the above, we assumed that |ηi| < 1 for both i = 0, 1.
However, if |ηi| = 1 for one or both i, then |1, 1〉TE (if |η0| =
1) or |0, 1〉TE (if |η1| = 1) never appear in the state following
E’s application of F . Note also that, if |η0| = 1 then, it must
hold that |e3〉 = eiθ |e1〉 for some θ (and a similar statement
may be made if |η1| = 1); this phase change will be done by
F in the forward direction and there is no need to “create” the
|e1〉 state later in the reverse, only the |e3〉 state (if |η1| = 1,
then |e2〉 = eiθ′ |e0〉 and so there is no need to “create” the |e2〉
state later, only change the phase which is done by F). Thus,
V ’s action on these states (|1, 1〉 or |0, 1〉) may be arbitrary
and we need not define the corresponding |gi〉. It is clear, then,
that V may be made a unitary operator, and the rest of the
proof follows as above.
We conclude, therefore, that regardless of A or B’s choices,
the state of the quantum system for all three parties is the
same whether E used C or R (meaning the resulting density
operator describing the joint systems are equal). Thus the view
from A, B, and E’s point of view are identical in both cases;
furthermore, the key-rate computation (Equation 2) will also
be identical in both cases.
Thus, to prove security of any SQKD protocol, it is suffi-
cient to consider only a restricted collective attack - security
against general collective attacks will follow from that. In
the next section, we will show how this result may be used
for a particular protocol to convert it into an equivalent
entanglement based version from which a quantum uncertainty
bound may be used to compute the key-rate.
Note that the choice of basis B is irrelevant to the at-
tacker. Thus, when analyzing the security of a SQKD pro-
tocol using this result, one is free to choose a basis that
simplifies the analysis and computations. In the remainder
of this paper, our proof assumes B = Z = {|0〉 , |1〉}. Also
note that our proof would hold even for protocols where
B performs a CNOT gate (acting on HT and his private
register) instead of a projective Z basis measurement when he
chooses Measure and Resend; mathematically, the two
operations will be identical in this case, and the proof above
follows through identically.
Before concluding this section, we point out a simplification
of our definition if we assume E’s attack is symmetric. This
is an assumption often made in quantum security proofs and
can even be enforced by the parties. In particular, if the Z
basis error induced by E’s attack in the forward channel can
be parameterized by a single variable Q (i.e., the probability
of an |i〉 flipping to a |1− i〉 in the forward channel is Q),
and if we work with respect to the Z basis (i.e., |vi〉 = |i〉),
then the restricted attack adopts a far simpler form:
Definition III.2. A symmetric restricted collective attack is
a tuple Rsym = (Q, η, U), where Q ∈ [0, 1], η ∈ D,
and U is a unitary operator acting on HT ⊗ HE . This
attack follows the same process as in Definition III.1, setting
R = (√1−Q,√1−Q, η,−η∗, U).
It is not difficult to see that if (q0, q1, η0, η1, U) is a
symmetric attack (i.e., q0 =
√
1−Q = q1), then it must hold
that η1 = −η∗0 .
B. An Entanglement Based Protocol
Our conversion from the prepare-and-measure protocol
ΠSQKD to an equivalent, entanglement based one, follows
several reductions. Our goal in this section is to construct a
new protocol whereby B (who is no longer classical) prepares
quantum states and sends them to A (who is still quantum).
However, by analyzing the security of this new protocol, we
will show security of the SQKD protocol ΠSQKD.
First, note that B’s Measure and Resend operation
may be equivalently modeled as a CNOT gate acting on the
qubit and an empty register private to B [3]. Of course, his
Reflect operation may be modeled as the identity operation.
Thus, when analyzing ΠSQKD we may instead analyze the case
where B applies a unitary operation acting on the qubit and
a register private to him. Second, we may assume that A,
instead of preparing and sending a random state of the form
|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, or |−〉, will instead prepare a Bell state of the
form 1√
2
(|00〉+|11〉), sending one particle to B while keeping
the other particle in her private lab. Standard arguments apply
to show that security of this new protocol (which we denote by
Π˜SQKD) implies security of the prepare and measure one ΠSQKD.
Furthermore, Theorem 1 still applies (see the comment after
the proof). It is clear that, if we prove security of Π˜SQKD then
security of ΠSQKD will follow.
Now, consider the following protocol which we denote by
Π∗, whose quantum communication stage consists of:
1) B prepares the state
√
p0 |000〉A1A2B+
√
p1 |110〉A1A2B
if he wishes to “Reflect” otherwise he prepares the
state
√
p0 |000〉A1A2B +
√
p1 |111〉A1A2B if he wishes
to “Measure and Resend” (he will chose the op-
eration randomly each iteration). The two qubits A1
and A2 are sent to Alice. Note that the terminology
“Measure and Resend” and “Reflect” no longer
has any real meaning in this protocol.
2) A receives both particles A1 and A2 and will measure
each in the Z basis or the X basis, choosing randomly.
3) If B chooses to Measure and Resend and if A uses
the Z basis, they may use their results as their raw-key
bit (we assume A1 is used as A’s raw-key bit, though
our analysis below would be symmetric if A2 were used
instead). Other iterations, along with a random subset
of these “raw-key” iterations, may be used for error
estimation in the obvious way.
We give E the ability to control the setting of p0 and p1
which can only increase her power (and, as a consequence,
also gives us partial device independence - indeed, one can
consider the scenario that E manufactured the device B is
using and programmed in a particular p0 and p1 value). A
collective attack against this protocol, thus, is a setting for
p0 (the value p1 = 1 − p0 of course) and a unitary operator
U acting on two qubits A1 and A2 and E’s private quantum
memory.
While Π∗ is not a “true” entanglement-based version (as B
is making a choice between two pure states), it would not be
difficult to make it one simply by increasing the dimension
of B’s space with an extra qubit (which, after measuring,
would determine his choice of Measure and Resend or
Reflect). However, as it turns out, the protocol as described
will be sufficient to complete our security analysis of the
prepare-and-measure protocol.
We claim that, if Π∗ is secure, then so is Π˜SQKD (in which
case, so is ΠSQKD). In particular, we will show that, for any
attack against Π˜SQKD, there exists an attack against Π∗ which
exactly replicates the resulting quantum system. In particular,
given an attack against Π˜SQKD, we will construct an attack
against Π∗ which first “rewinds” the forward channel attack
simulating the system had A initially sent a qubit as opposed
to B. Informally, as an example, if B sends a |0〉 in the A1
register (which he never does - it is always a pair of qubits
but this is simply for illustration), then we construct an attack
which causes A to receive a |0〉 or |1〉 in her A1 register with
the same probabilities as if she had sent a |0〉 or a |1〉 and
B happened to measure a |0〉 if they were running Π˜SQKD.
Furthermore, E’s memory will be in the same state in both
cases. Thus, we will “rewind” the forward channel for Π∗ to
simulate the scenario where A sends a qubit first instead of
B sending a qubit first. The only thing E cannot “rewind”
is the probability of B observing certain outcomes in Π˜SQKD
- thus the need for her to set the value of p0 during device
construction.
Theorem 2. Let (UF , UR) be a collective attack used against
Π˜SQKD and let ρABE be the density operator describing a single
iteration of this protocol Π˜SQKD when E uses this attack. Then,
there exists an attack E = (p0, U) against Π∗ such that, if
σABE is the resulting density operator when running Π∗ using
attack E , it holds that ρABE = σABE assuming the probability
that B chooses Measure and Resend in Π˜SQKD is the
same as in Π∗ (and thus the probability of choosing Reflect
is also the same in both protocols).
Proof. Let (UF , UR) be a collective attack against Π˜SQKD.
Since Theorem 1 applies, there exists an equivalent restricted
attack consisting of the forward operator F as described in
Equation 3. We construct the desired attack E against Π∗.
Consider the following operator Rw to be used against Π∗
in order to “rewind” the forward channel attack. The action of
this operator is:
Rw |00〉A1A2 =
q0 |000〉A1A2E +
√
1− q21 |10f〉A1A2E√
1− q21 + q20
(8)
Rw |11〉A1A2 =
√
1− q20 |01e〉A1A2E + q1 |110〉A1A2E√
1− q20 + q21
,
where |e〉 and |f〉 are the states resulting from the application
of F (see Equations 4 and 5). We claim that Rw is an isometry
(and thus can be extended to a unitary operation). This is not
difficult to see: let |v0〉 = Rw |00〉 and |v1〉 = Rw |11〉. It is
clear that 〈v0|v1〉 = 〈v1|v0〉 = 0. Furthermore:
〈v0|v0〉 = 1
1− q21 + q20
(q20 + 1− q21) = 1,
and similarly 〈v1|v1〉 = 1. Thus, Rw is an isometry from
HA1A2 → HA1A2E . We abuse notation from here and assume
Rw is a unitary operator (its action on other states may be
arbitrary).
Now, consider the following attack against Π∗: E =
(p0, (IA1 ⊗ UR) · Rw), where p0 = 12 (1 − q21 + q20) (and, so,
p1 = 1− p0 = 12 (1− q20 + q21)). We claim this is the desired
attack. Indeed, if B chooses to Reflect in Π˜SQKD, then the
state of the system after the qubit leaves B’s lab, but before
E applies UR is:
|ψRA1A2BE〉 =
1√
2
(
q0 |0000〉+
√
1− q20 |010e〉
)
+
1√
2
(√
1− q21 |100f〉+ q1 |1100〉
)
,
where the order of the systems on the right-hand-side of the
above expression are: A1A2BE (note B is un-entangled from
the above system). At this point, E has control only of the
A2E subspace.
On the other hand, if B chooses Reflect in Π∗, then the
state of the system after E applies Rw but before finishing the
attack with UR, is:
|φRA1A2BE〉 = (9)√
p0√
1− q21 + q20
(
q0 |0000〉+
√
1− q21 |100f〉
)
+
√
p1√
1− q20 + q21
(√
1− q20 |010e〉+ q1 |1100〉
)
=
1√
2
(
q0 |0000〉+
√
1− q21 |100f〉
)
+
1√
2
(√
1− q20 |010e〉+ q1 |1100〉
)
,
from which it is clear that |ψRA1A2BE〉 ≡ |φRA1A2BE〉. With
Π˜SQKD, E will then apply UR (acting on A2E) to |ψR〉 and
then forward the A2 system to Alice; with Π∗, E will apply
the same UR (also acting on the subspace A2E) to |φR〉 and
forwards both A1 and A2 to Alice. Regardless, we find the
quantum system held by all three parties to be equal.
The case when B chooses to Measure and Resend is
similar. Indeed, in this case, consider the state before E applies
UR for Π˜SQKD:
|ψMA1A2BE〉 =
1√
2
(
q0 |0000〉+
√
1− q20 |011e〉
)
+
1√
2
(√
1− q21 |100f〉+ q1 |1110〉
)
.
And, the case for Π∗ after E applies Rw but before UR is:
|φMA1A2BE〉 = (10)√
p0√
1− q21 + q20
(
q0 |0000〉+
√
1− q21 |100f〉
)
+
√
p1√
1− q20 + q21
(√
1− q20 |011e〉+ q1 |1110〉
)
=
1√
2
(
q0 |0000〉+
√
1− q21 |100f〉
)
+
1√
2
(√
1− q20 |011e〉+ q1 |1110〉
)
.
Again, we conclude the two systems will be the same after
application of UR. The final density operator will then be a
mixture of the two pure states. Assuming the probability that
B chooses to Measure and Resend in Π˜SQKD is equal
to the probability he chooses this option in Π∗ (and thus,
the probability of choosing Reflect is also equal in both
protocols) the resulting density operators will be identical.
Notice that, when attacking Π∗, E has control of both A1
and A2 (which she does not when attacking Π˜SQKD). Thus, she
has possibly more attack strategies against Π∗. However, for
every attack against Π˜SQKD, there exists an equivalent attack
against Π∗. Thus, to prove security of Π˜SQKD (and thus ΠSQKD,
our goal), it suffices to analyze Π∗ as E has potentially
more attack capabilities against the latter. Indeed, we have
the following “chain:”
Π∗ =⇒ Π∗res =⇒ Π˜SQKD =⇒ ΠSQKD,
where Π∗res is the protocol Π
∗ but with E restricted to attacks
of the form E = (p0, (IA1 ⊗ U) · Rw).
C. Final Key-Rate Bound
Consider the protocol Π∗ introduced in the previous sub-
section. There are two “modes” to it: either B chooses
to Measure and Resend (with probability PM ) or he
chooses to Reflect (with probability PR) - not that these
terms have the same meaning as their wording implies. A
single iteration of the protocol, then, may be written as the
density operator:
ρA1A2BE = PMσA1A2BE + PRτA1A2BE ,
where:
σA1A2BE =
[
φMA1A2BE
]
, τA1A2BE =
[
φRA1A2BE
]
(11)
and |φM 〉 and |φR〉 are the (pure) states in the event
B chooses Measure and Resend or Reflect re-
spectively. Now, only those iterations where B chooses
Measure and Resend are used for key distillation and,
so, to compute the key-rate of this protocol, we need to
compute S(AZ1 |E)σ where we use AZ1 to denote the result
of A measuring her A1 register in the Z basis (recall A uses
only A1 for her key distillation). However, we will first analyze
S(A1|E)τ and use this to bound the entropy in σ.
It was shown in [24], that for any density operator acting
on a tripartite Hilbert space HA⊗HB ⊗HE , that if A and B
make measurements in the Z or X basis, then:
S(AZ |E) + S(AX |B) ≥ 1, (12)
where we use AZ (respectively AX ) to denote the register stor-
ing the result of a Z (respectively X) basis measurement on
the A system. Using this, we may easily prove the following:
Lemma 1. Let τA1A2BE be the state of the system if B
chooses Reflect in protocol Π∗ and let QX be the error
rate in the X basis between registers A1 and A2. Then:
S(AZ1 |E)τ ≥ 1− h(QX). (13)
Proof. Note that B is completely independent of the A1A2E
system; i.e., τA1A2BE ≡ τA1A2E⊗[0]B . Thus, we may simply
consider the state resulting from tracing out B which acts on
the tripartite system HA1 ⊗HA2 ⊗HE . Using the uncertainty
relation described above (see Equation 12), replacing B with
A2 (thus, in a way, we are imagining A as two people - one
who holds the A1 register and the other who holds the A2
register - of course in real life they are one individual), we
have:
S(AZ1 |E) ≥ 1− S(AX1 |A2)
≥ 1−H(AX1 |AX2 )
= 1− h(QX),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that measure-
ments can only increase entropy.
We will use the conditional entropy of τA1E to compute a
bound on the entropy in σA1E , thus giving us our desired key-
rate computation. For the following result, we will assume a
symmetric attack in that the observed Z basis noise is equal
in both forward and reverse channels; this is only to make
the algebra more amicable - analyzing an asymmetric channel
would follow the same process, just with slightly more, yet
trivial, algebra.
Before we continue, however, we require one lemma which,
though straight-forward to show, we include for completeness:
Lemma 2. Let σ = |v0〉 〈v1|+ |v1〉 〈v0|. Then:
||σ|| ≤ 2
√
〈v0|v0〉 〈v1|v1〉.
Proof. Recall that the trace norm is invariant to unitary
changes in basis. We decompose |v0〉 and |v1〉 as:
|v0〉 = x |E〉 , |v1〉 = heiθ |E〉+ d |I〉 ,
where 〈E|E〉 = 〈I|I〉 = 1 and 〈E|I〉 = 0. Furthermore, we
may assume x, h, d ∈ R (any alternative phase of x or d
may be absorbed into the corresponding basis vector). In this
{|E〉 , |I〉} basis, we have:
σ =
(
xheiθ + xhe−iθ xd
xd 0
)
=
(
2xRe
(
heiθ
)
xd
xd 0
)
,
the eigenvalues of which are:
λ± = xRe
(
heiθ
)±√x2Re2 (heiθ) + x2d2.
Writing 〈v0|v1〉 = a+bi, with a, b ∈ R, we have the following
identities (which follows from the decomposition of |v0〉 and
|v1〉):
x2 = 〈v0|v0〉 (14)
heiθ =
〈v0|v1〉
x
=
a
x
+
b
x
i⇒ h2 = a
2
x2
+
b2
x2
(15)
h2 + d2 = 〈v1|v1〉 ⇒ d2 = 〈v1|v1〉 − a
2
x2
− b
2
x2
. (16)
Substituting these into λ± yields:
λ± = xRe
(
heiθ
)±√x2Re2 (heiθ) + x2d2
= a±
√
a2 + x2 〈v1|v1〉 − a2 − b2
= a±
√
〈v0|v0〉 〈v1|v1〉 − b2.
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality forces b2 ≤ 〈v0|v0〉 〈v1|v1〉,
so the square-root is real. In fact, by the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality:
a2 + b2 ≤ 〈v0|v0〉 〈v1|v1〉 ⇒ |a| ≤
√
〈v0|v0〉 〈v1|v1〉 − b2.
(17)
Now: ||σ|| = |λ+| + |λ−|. If a ≥ 0, then, using Equation 17
and letting δ =
√〈v0|v0〉 〈v1|v1〉 − b2 (thus 0 ≤ a ≤ δ):
||σ|| = |a+ δ|+ |a− δ| = (a+ δ) + (δ − a) = 2δ.
Alternatively, if a < 0:
||σ|| = |a+ δ|+ |a− δ| = (a+ δ) + (δ − a) = 2δ.
Of course δ ≤√〈v0|v0〉 〈v1|v1〉 completing the proof.
Finally, we prove the following theorem which bounds the
von Neumann entropy in σ allowing us to compute the key-
rate of this SQKD protocol.
Theorem 3. Given σA1A2BE and τA1A2BE as defined above
in Equation 11, let Q be the error rate in the Z basis observed
on a single channel (we assume both channels have the same
Z basis error rate). Also, let δ be defined as:
δ = 2Q(1−Q) +
(
1
2
+ 2Q[1−Q]
)
· h
(
4Q(1−Q)
1 + 4Q(1−Q)
)
.
Then, assuming E’s attack is symmetric and of the form
E = (1/2, (IA1 ⊗ V )Rw), where V acts on HA2E and Rw
is a “rewind” operator as discussed earlier, it holds that
S(AZ1 |E)σ ≥ f(Q), where:
f(Q) =
{
S(AZ1 |E)τ − δ if S(AZ1 |E)τ ≥ 2δ
1
2S(A
Z
1 |E)τ otherwise (18)
Proof. Let U be an arbitrary attack operator used against Π∗
(this is an isometry fromHA1A2 toHA1A2E). Also, let |φ±〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉±|11〉) be two Bell states. Without loss of generality,
we may write U ’s action as:
U |φ+〉 =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
|a, b〉A1A2 ⊗ |eab〉E (19)
U |φ−〉 =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
|a, b〉A1A2 ⊗ |fab〉E ,
where the states |eab〉 and |fab〉 are arbitrary, not necessarily
normalized nor orthogonal, states in HE . The density operator
τAZ1 AZ2 E (which is the state of the system when B chooses
Reflect in protocol Π∗ and A measures both her qubits in
the Z basis - an operation denoted by M below) when faced
with this attack is found to be:
τAZ1 AZ2 E =M [U [φ+]U
∗] =
∑
a,b
[a,b]⊗ [eab]
⇒τAZ1 E =
∑
a∈{0,1}
[a]⊗ ([ea0] + [ea1]).
Likewise, we may compute σ, the density operator for those
iterations where B chooses Measure and Resend (note
that, below, we define P (z) = zz∗):
σAZ1 AZ2 E =M
[
U
(
1
2
[00] +
1
2
[11])
)
U∗
]
=M
[
1
4
P (U |φ+〉+ U |φ−〉) + 1
4
P (U |φ+〉 − U |φ−〉)
]
=
1
4
∑
a,b
[a,b]⊗ (P [|ea,b〉+ |fa,b〉] + P [|ea,b〉 − |fa,b〉])
=
1
2
∑
a,b
[a,b]⊗ ([ea,b] + [fa,b]).
From the above, it is not difficult to see:
σAZ1 E =
1
2
τAZ1 E +
1
2
µAZ1 E , (20)
where:
µAZ1 E =
∑
a
[a]⊗ ([fa0] + [fa1]). (21)
Thus, by concavity of conditional entropy, we have:
S(AZ1 |E)σ ≥
1
2
S(AZ1 |E)τ +
1
2
S(AZ1 |E)µ (22)
Recall that we are actually interested in proving security
against Π˜SQKD and so only need to concern ourselves with
attacks of the form: U = (IA1 ⊗V )Rw. From Equation 8, and
noting that, since we are assuming a symmetric attack in that
p0 = p1 = 1/2 and so q20 = q
2
1 , the action of Rw on |φ±〉 is:
Rw |φ±〉 = 1√
2
(q0 |000〉+ q¯1 |10f〉 ± q¯0 |01e〉 ± q1 |110〉),
where we use q¯0 to mean
√
1− q20 (and similarly for q¯1) and
where |e〉 and |f〉 are defined in Equations 4 and 5.
Now, we may, without loss of generality, describe V ’s action
as follows (recall V is a unitary operator acting on HA2E):
V |00〉 = |0, e0〉+ |1, e1〉 , V |10〉 = |0, e2〉+ |1, e3〉
V |0f〉 = |0, f0〉+ |1, f1〉 , V |1e〉 = |0, f2〉+ |1, f3〉
Thus, after applying attack U = (IA1 ⊗ V ) · Rw to |φ±〉, we
find:
√
2U |φ±〉 = q0 |00e0〉+ q0 |01e1〉+ q¯1 |10f0〉+ q¯1 |11f1〉
± q¯0 |00f2〉 ± q¯0 |01f3〉 ± q1 |10e2〉 ± q1 |11e3〉
Translating to notation used in Equation 19, we find:
|e00〉 = 1√
2
(q0 |e0〉+ q¯0 |f2〉)
|e01〉 = 1√
2
(q0 |e1〉+ q¯0 |f3〉)
|e10〉 = 1√
2
(q¯1 |f0〉+ q1 |e2〉)
|e11〉 = 1√
2
(q¯1 |f1〉+ q1 |e3〉) ,
while the states |fab〉 are found simply by taking |eab〉 and
changing the “+” to a “−” in between the two kets.
Our goal is to determine a bound on S(AZ1 |E)µ using
S(AZ1 |E)τ . To do so, we will use a continuity bound on condi-
tional entropy determined by Winter in [25] (a tighter version
of the Alicki-Fannes inequality [26]). Using this bound, we
have:
|S(AZ1 |E)τ − S(AZ1 |E)µ| ≤ + (1 + )h
(

1 + 
)
, (23)
where:
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣τAZ1 E − µAZ1 E∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤  ≤ 1.
Thus, if we bound the trace distance between τ and µ we can
determine an upper-bound on S(AZ1 |E)µ thus giving us our
result.
By the triangle inequality, we have:∣∣∣∣∣∣τAZ1 E − µAZ1 E∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∑
a,b
||[eab]− [fab]||
= q0q¯0 |||e0〉 〈f2|+ |f2〉 〈e0|||
+ q0q¯0 |||e1〉 〈f3|+ |f3〉 〈e1|||
+ q¯1q1 |||f0〉 〈e2|+ |e2〉 〈f0|||
+ q¯1q1 |||f1〉 〈e3|+ |e3〉 〈f1|||
≤ 2q0q¯0
√
〈e0|e0〉 〈f2|f2〉
+ 2q0q¯0
√
〈e1|e1〉 〈f3|f3〉
+ 2q¯1q1
√
〈e2|e2〉 〈f0|f0〉
+ 2q¯1q1
√
〈e3|e3〉 〈f1|f1〉,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.
Assuming the attack is symmetric, with Q being the Z basis
noise in each channel (i.e., the probability of a |i〉 flipping to
a |1− i〉 in either channel is Q), then it is easy to see that
q0 = q1 =
√
1−Q (thus q¯1 = q¯0 =
√
Q) and also:
〈e0|e0〉 = 〈e3|e3〉 = 〈f0|f0〉 = 〈f3|f3〉 = (1−Q)
〈e1|e1〉 = 〈e2|e2〉 = 〈f1|f1〉 = 〈f2|f2〉 = Q
(Note that these values are observable by A and B in both Π∗
and ΠSQKD.)
Thus:
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣τAZ1 E − µAZ1 E∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12 (8√Q(1−Q)√Q(1−Q)) (24)
= 4Q(1−Q). (25)
From Equation 23, and setting  = 4Q(1−Q), we have:
S(AZ1 |E)µ ≥ S(AZ1 |E)τ − − (1 + )h
(

1 + 
)
.
Combining this with Equation 22, and also noting that, since
µAZ1 E is a classical-quantum state, and so S(A
Z
1 |E)µ ≥ 0,
completes the proof.
Note that the only place we used a symmetric assumption
was in the computation of qi, 〈ei|ei〉, and 〈fi|fi〉 and in
the assumption that B sends Bell states |φ±〉; if the attack
was asymmetric, the only thing that would change would
be these quantities - however our technique used in the
proof of Theorem 3 would still apply, it would just require
more algebra. Note, however, that since these are observable
quantities, A and B can even enforce that E use a symmetric
attack.
The key-rate of the protocol Π∗res, therefore, is:
r = S(AZ1 |E)σ −H(AZ1 |BZ)σ
≥ g(Q,QX)− h(Q), (26)
where:
g(Q,QX) =
{
1− h(QX)− δ if 1− h(QX) ≥ 2δ
1
2 (1− h(QX)) otherwise
and δ is defined in Theorem 3. Note that, above, we used
the trivial fact that H(AZ1 |BZ)σ = h(Q) in this scenario (an
asymmetric attack will be different, but also easily computed).
Of course, by our analysis conducted above, the key-rate of
ΠSQKD can only be higher than this.
We now evaluate our new key-rate bound, in particular
its noise tolerance, comparing to current known results. In
[14], a lower bound on the key-rate of ΠSQKD was derived
without mismatched measurements. In [17], we derived a new
bound, but using numerous mismatched measurement statistics
(e.g., the probability of a |+〉 being measured as a |0〉). Such
statistics give greater information on the attack being used
(thus increasing the bound on S(A|E)) but at the cost of
wasting quantum communication on error estimation.
As shown in Table I, the noise tolerance of our new bound
here is higher than previous best work utilizing only noise
statistics (and not mismatched measurements) [14]. However,
it is lower than the bound derived using mismatched measure-
ments as we did in [17]. Note that we did not require any
mismatched measurements for our derivation in this paper,
thus it is expected that our key-rate bound may not be as
high as that discovered in [17]. In that work, we used over
12 different measurement statistics to bound S(A|E). In this
security proof, we are only using three measurement statistics:
the error rate in the Z basis (for both channels) and the
X error rate observed by A. Thus, it is not surprising our
noise tolerance here is lower. An interesting open question is
whether this difference is primarily an artifact of our proof (in
particular, Theorem 3 may not be tight) or whether this shows
the necessity of using mismatched statistics for this protocol
(such statistics are known to be highly beneficial to limited-
resource protocols [27] and even required for some SQKD
Old Proof [14] New Proof w/MM [17]
QX = Q 5.34% 6.14% 11%
QX = 2Q(1−Q) 4.57% 4.82% 7.9%
QX =
1
2
Q 5.92% 7.5% 15.12%
TABLE I
SHOWING THE MAXIMAL NOISE TOLERANCE (I.E., THE MAXIMUM Q FOR
WHICH THE KEY-RATE OF ΠSQKD REMAINS POSITIVE) OF ΠSQKD DERIVED
HERE (MIDDLE COLUMN LABELED “NEW PROOF”). ALSO COMPARING
WITH CURRENT KNOWN RESULTS FOR THIS PROTOCOL. “OLD PROOF” IS
FROM [14] AND BOUNDED THE KEY-RATE USING ONLY THREE NOISE
STATISTICS (AS WAS DONE HERE). “W/MM” WAS FROM [17] AND
UTILIZED MISMATCHED MEASUREMENTS (IN TOTAL OVER 12 DIFFERENT
MEASUREMENT STATISTICS AS OPPOSED TO ONLY THREE USED HERE).
OUR NEW RESULT IS HIGHER THAN THAT IN [14], BUT NOT AS HIGH AS
WHEN UTILIZING MISMATCHED MEASUREMENT STATISTICS. SEE TEXT
FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION.
protocols [28]). We intend to investigate this further in the
near future.
D. Comment on General Attacks
Normally, one may extend the computations done for col-
lective attacks to produce security against general attacks,
in the asymptotic scenario, by invoking a de Finetti type
argument [29], [30], [31]. It seems like this should also hold
for our security proof here, however, due to our reliance on the
restricted collective attack, this would require a more rigorous
proof1. We suspect the results in this paper would carry
through to imply security against general attacks, however we
leave a formal, rigorous, proof of this as future work.
IV. CLOSING REMARKS
In this paper, we presented an entirely new proof of se-
curity for a semi-quantum protocol. By first reducing the
problem to an equivalent entanglement-based protocol and
then using a quantum entropic uncertainty relation, along
with a continuity bound on conditional von Neumann entropy,
we were able to derive a cleaner key-rate expression for
this protocol than previous work. Furthermore, our new key-
rate has a higher noise tolerance than previous work without
mismatched measurements. Of course, our new key-rate has a
lower tolerance than when using mismatched measurements.
An open question worth investigating is whether this is an
artifact of our proof technique or if mismatched measurements
are absolutely required for this protocol to achieve optimal
noise tolerance.
This new technique we developed in this paper, along with
the various security results produced along the way, such as
the restricted attack, may hold great application in studying
other protocols relying on a two-way channel. It may also
hold the key to studying SQKD protocols relying on higher-
dimensional quantum channels such as the one proposed in
[20] based on quantum walks. We suspect this technique can
be suitably adapted to handle other two-way protocols and
other semi-quantum protocols in higher dimensions.
1Thanks to Rotem Liss for our conversations on this.
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